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1 The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
1.1

Introducing the Game

Throughout our daily lives, we must make decisions on whether or not to cooperate with
other people. In some situations it makes sense to cooperate no matter what. For example,
when a policeman asks a person to pull over her car, complying helps her avoid a high
speed chase; however, many situations also give us great incentives to not cooperate or
defect. Whenever the dirty dishes pile up, a person can try to not clean them in the hope that
his roommate will clean them instead. The latter example resembles the Iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, and when run in a social simulation, such as one provided by a cellular
automaton, many complex patterns emerge. When one assumes players act with memory
of their opponents decision to cooperate or defect, these patterns include everything from
fractals to Universal Computation, and the number of iterations of the game has great effect
on the outcome of a simulation.
Created by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher in 1950 [3], the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game gets its name from the following scenario: Bob and Terry recently robbed a 7-11, but
the police don’t quite have enough evidence to prove it. Bob and Terry know that they’ll
both receive minor sentences of a few months if they don’t confess. Aware of this, the
police put Bob and Terry in separate interrogation rooms and offer them each a deal. If
Bob or Terry gives evidence on the other to the interrogators, they’ll get to leave without
receiving any charges, but the person who doesn’t confess will receive a harsher sentence
of five months. If both provide evidence on each other, both will spend at least four months
in prison. This scenario creates Table 1.
To read Bob and Terry’s table choose either cooperate or defect for each. Trace the
row and column to the appropriate cell. Bob’s sentence will be to the left of the slash, and
Terry’s sentence will be on the right. Notice that one can switch Bob and Terry’s place on
1

Terry
cooperate
defect
cooperate
defect

2 m onths/,
/ 2 months

5 m onths/,
/ 0 months

0 months/C
/ 5 months

4 m o n th s/
,u
/ 4 months

Table 1: The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game in months
the table, and it still gives the same points for defecting or cooperating.
Now the example with Bob and Terry is a bit more specific than the general Pris
oner’s Dilemma Game(also referred to as PDG). In order to derive the general game, ex
amine the previous example in terms of opportunity costs(we will use the same notation
as Axelrod [3]). Let R be the reward for cooperating. The worst possible scenario costs
Bob or Terry 5 months in jail. Using this we can assign R as the worst case imprisonment
minus the cooperation imprisonment. This gives us 5 — 2 = 3, and R = 3 . Let T be the
temptation to cooperate, P the lesser reward for mutual defection, and S be the suckers
payoff. Similar to R, we can derive T = 5 —0 = 5, P = 5 —4 = 1 , and S = 5 —5 = 0.
Now lets examine the latter in Table 2:

co

co

cooperate
defect

Player 2
cooperate
defect
S = 0/ t = 5
T = 5/s = o P = 1/P =1

Table 2: The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
The numbers 5, 3, 1, and 0 may seem strict. Many events don’t follow a ratio of 5,
3, 1, and 0, and this might lead one to think that many things won’t reduce to the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game. Luckily, one doesn’t need to use the numbers 5, 3, 1, and 0, rather one can
use any numbers for T, R, P , and S that follow the following rules set by Axelrod in his
paper on Cooperation [3]. Examine the equations in Figure 1.
Equation (1) shows that the temptation to defect outweighs the benefits of both
cooperating; furthermore, both cooperating outweighs the punishment for both players de-
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T >R >P >S

(1)

R > (s + T)/2

(2)

Figure 1: Axelrod’s Inequalities for the PDG
fecting, but if only one cooperates and the other defects, cooperating will return the lowest
possible amount of points. Notice that (1) implies that as a group, both players cooperat
ing gives more points than both players defecting: 2R > 2P. Equation (2) ensures that
as a group, cooperating has a higher combined return than one cooperating and the other
defecting: 2 R > S + T .
Using these generalizations, one can represent any situation that matches the re
quirements of (1) and (2) with the PDG. In fact the great breadth of situations representable
by the PDG might surprise the reader. Sometimes Ribonucleic acid conforms to the Pris
oner’s Dilemma Game when two viruses try to infect the same cell [11]. Vampiric bats can
choose whether or not to regurgitate food for unfed companions, instead of keeping it all
to itself [17]. In the U.S. Senate, cooperating to help other’s pass bills competes with one’s
own self interest, also creating the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game [15]. One could also argue
that trench warfare also created the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, [4][2]; Axelrod shows that
whether or not members from one trench kill members in another trench satisfy the equa
tion T > R > P > S or (1). Lymphoma also has to balance it’s desire to propagate with
keeping it’s host alive in order to propagate to other organisms[13][14]. In economics, in
teractions amongst oligopolies also fit the PDG [10]. Many of the previous examples are
also examples of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Finding everyday situations that fit the prisoner’s dilemma can add a fun way to
apply the results found in this paper to one’s own life. For example, every now and then the
dishes in my sink will stack up to the ceiling, at which point both my roommate and I have
the option to cooperate, and clean the dishes together, or we can wait to see if the other will
3

tackle the miserable task on her own. If we both clean the dishes, we’ll both be moderately
content. If one of us cleans all the dishes, the cleaner will feel under-appreciated while the
roommate will have gotten his dishes done without contributing any work. If neither of us
clean, we’ll still have a pile of dirty dishes, but neither of us will feel under-appreciated.
The Table 3 fits the equations (1) and (2) from Figure 1 on page 3.
Roommate
clean dishes
relax
clean dishes
relax

5 utility/ 5 utility

-1utility/ 8 utility

8 utility/ 1 utility

1 utility/ 1 utility

Table 3: Cleaning the Dishes PDG
To avoid confusion, the values 5, 3, 1, and 0 shall be used in place of the variables
T , R , P , and S throughout the rest of the paper.

1.2

The Nash Equilibrium and Iterating the Game

So why do game theorists bother with the PDG at all; what makes it interesting? Here
we need to examine the Nash equilibrium, but first lets play with this. Examining Table 2
on page 2 breaks down two independent player’s decisions. Assuming that both of these
players wish to maximize their points, with no knowledge of what the opponent will do,
each must choose to cooperate or defect. If player 1 cooperates, she can earn at most 3
points and at worst no points. If player 1 defects, she can potentially earn 5 points (the
most points attainable by a single entity in the game) and at worst she will score 1 point. If
player 2 chose to cooperate or defect based off a coin toss, player 1 would gain an average
of 1.5 points whenever she cooperated. For defecting, player 1 would gain an average of 3
points (the maximum attainable from cooperating). If player 1 chose to defect every time
she played the game, she could potentially win twice as many points.
The Nash Equilibrium enforces the belief that a player will always defect. The Nash
4

Equilibrium is the stable interaction that occurs when both players choose the dominant
strategy. For one round of the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game a player can make 3 or 0 points
for cooperating or 5 or 1 point(s) for defecting. Thus, defecting is the obvious dominant
strategy. When both players defect, we call it the Nash Equilibrium.
Up to this point we’ve examined the PDG and what a player should do if playing the
game just once. If two entities play the game against each other more than once(retaining
their points from each round), what a player should do changes significantly. We call this
multi-round version of the PDG the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (IPDG for short).
At first glance, one might assume that we should use the Nash Equilibrium. The Nash
Equilibrium will lead to both players always defecting, similar to what one would do in a
single round. The proof for this goes like this:
Assume that two players play the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game for N rounds.
If we assume they always defect, like the Nash Equilibrium for one round, we’re done.
Instead, let us assume that both players cooperate initially. On the N th round, or the last
round, one of the players will defect in the hopes of maximizing his points. The other,
equally aware of this dominant strategy will do the same. Now look at the N — 1 round.
One of the players will defect on this round, again hoping to maximize his points. The
other does the same. This repeats for the N — 2 round, N — 3, N — 4 ... and 1st round.
Recursively, each player defects every round they assume the opponent might cooperate.
Thus we have shown that the Nash Equilibrium for the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
is to defect every round.
At this point lets examine mathematical expressions that describe the possible amount
of points a player can get. Let a and b be the moves made by two players in the game, and
g(a, b) G {5, 3,1, 0} be the points a earned from one game. Examine Figure 2. The func
tion in equation (3) represents the possible points that a single player gets playing this
game. If g(n) is a constant, c G {5, 3,1, 0}, then ^™=0 g(n) simplifies to c • n. Using this
5

we can derive equation (4), the points gained if both players always cooperate, and equation
(5), the points gained if both players always defect. Notice that the cooperative function (4)
gives triple the amount of points for both players than the one achieved through the Nash
Equilibrium, (5). The last two equations here represent the maximum (6), and minimum
(7) points that one can achieve by playing a special rule called Tit for Tat.
n
(3)
R(n) = 3 • n

(4)

P (n) = n

(5)

Ti(n) = 3 • (n — 1) + 5

(6)

T2(n) = 5 + (n — 1)

(7)

Figure 2: Equations for the IPDG
Tit for Tat is a simple, yet powerful rule for playing the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Game. The strategy of Tit for Tat always cooperates on the first round. After this, Tit for
Tat always copies the previous move of the opponent. We can see this clearly in equations
(6) and (7). Equation (6) shows the points gained if one cooperates every single round, and
then defects. Interestingly enough, this strategy gives the most points, but it does not follow
the Nash Equilibrium. Equation (7) shows the points a player will receive if she uses the
Nash Equilibrium against Tit for Tat. The first defection has a high reward (5 points), but
Tit for Tat essentially punishes the player by defecting in response to every round that the
opponent defected. In this way, playing against Tit for Tat encourages cooperation.
Robert Axelrod made Tit for Tat practically famous in his book and papers on the
Evolution o f Cooperation [3][4]. Axelrod created several different computer tournaments
that pitted different strategies for the IPDG against each other, and in almost every different
environment he used to pit the strategies against each other, Tit for Tat prevailed as the clear
victor. Axelrod writes: “What can be said for the empirical success of TIT FOR TAT is
6

that it is a very robust rule: it does well over a wide range of environments. Part of its
success might be that other rules anticipate its presence and are deigned to do well with
it. Doing well with TIT FOR TAT requires cooperating with it, and this in turn helps TIT
FOR TAT.” (53) In only one environment did Tit for Tat fail or perform worse than other
strategies. We call this environment, based off of competing neighborhoods and territory,
Cellular Automata.
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2
2.1

Cellular Automata Theory
What is Cellular Automata?

Now imagine yourself in a classroom. Everyone sits facing the teacher, spaced about uni
formly apart. All of the sudden student A hears a rumor about the professor and decides
to tell his nearest neighbors, students B, C, and D. These three students then tell all of
their neighbors, and so on. Pretty soon everyone has heard the rumor, including all of the
students sitting across the room (Figure 3). If we examine this example more closely we
can define how rumors spread. First we have a lattice of students, and we know that each
student can only whisper to a student close by. We call these students within the whisper
range neighbors. Next, we can define two states for the students: those who know and those
who don’t. We also know that once a student learns a rumor she will tell all her neighbors,
creating a rule for how each student updates their state. We have formalized this class
room; we could now program a spatial simulation for how rumors spread in a classroom on
a computer, also known as a Cellular Automaton.

Figure 3: Rumor Spreading in a Classroom

8

In order to be a cellular automaton(abbreviated as CA) a simulation has distinct
states like a 1 or a 0 and know or don’t know. The states need not be finite, one could
have an infinite number of discrete states. It must also have a uniform rule for updating
states based off of neighbors or a combination of one’s neighbors and oneself. Some other
rules generally apply such as synchronicity, where all cells or nodes must update at the
same time. Some Cellular Automata do not follow all of these rules. For example, certain
simulations may benefit from asynchronous updating or different rules for updating states
based off of location [19].
Using the previous classroom example lets try to create our own cellular automaton!
First we can define each student as a node with the states 1 for knowing the rumor or 0 for
not knowing the rumor. Each node has one or more links to another node within whispering
distance. Every time cycle, we update each node in the network with a simple rule: if a
node with state 0 is linked to a node with state 1, it will update its status to a 1. If the node
is already in state 1, do nothing. And we’re done! Program this into a computer, add some
fancy graphics for your students if you want, and you’ll have your own cellular automaton.
If we wanted to make this even simpler we can assume that our classroom exists
on a grid or a lattice instead of a network. Often in kindergarten through 12th grade most
students spend their time in a setting similar to a grid, where each has her or his own desk
spaced uniformly apart from all the other students. This makes our simulation even easier
to visualize and program since it creates a uniform neighborhood for each of our nodes.
For example, we can assume that each student can only whisper to a student to the north,
south, east, or west of them. Now our students look and interact more like square cells.
This example highlights the meaning in the words Cellular Automata. The cellular
in Cellular Automata stands for the study of simulations made up of either nodes and net
works or cells and lattices. The automata part describes how each cell acts locally, as if it
were its own small processor.
9

2.2

Cool Cellular Automata

The simulations of Cellular Automata span many subjects both useful and philosophical.
Wolfram first pioneered the subject with his work on one dimensional, two state cellular
automata[19][21]. Based off of all the possible states a cell could take on according to
its previous state and its two closest neighbors Wolfram separated the different one dimen
sioned CA into 256 different “rules”. Examine Figure 4 below. In each of these simulations,
the time steps are shown in descending order from top to bottom, so that the top line will
be t = 0 and the nth line will be t = n.

Figure 4: Different Wolfram Rules

Although Wolfram's rules may seem simple at first glance, an in depth analysis of
their behavior could fill thousands of pages. For now, take in the depth and breadth of
knowledge that Wolfram’s rules cover. On the left, Wolfram’s rule 30 can simulate random
numbers. This means that one can use rule 30 or a different CA for cryptography or appli
cations that simulate probabilities. In the middle, rule 90 creates a famous fractal known
as the Sierpinski Triangle. Rule 90 also represents the odd numbers in the Pascal Trian
gle with an “alive” or black cell(evens are white). Finally on the right, rule 126 emulates
the colors made by the proteins of the shell shown in the picture. Although its not shown
here, rules 110, 124, 137, and 193 exhibit Universal Computation. Universal Computation
means that these rules have all of the properties of a Universal Turing Machine, a mathe
10

matical model for a computer. We will examine how simple interactions amongst squares
can do everything a computer can do in the next section.
Other CA are made for the purpose of simulating social interactions. Ofcourse,
Axelrod used CA to test strategies of the IPDG against each other; however, this repre
sents just one focus of research amongst many within CA theory. A much simpler cellular
automaton called Majority Rules can also simulate how people change and react based on
their neighbors. In fact Majority Rules can be implemented in many different ways to show
what a person will do based on what her neighbors will do. As the title of the simulation
implies, a cell usually changes its state to whatever a majority of its neighbors are, but one
can also insert random changes in state, barriers to change, and other variables into the
simulation. Using Majority Rules, one can see how things like political opinions [6][7],
obesity [5], or happiness [8] spread amongst a population.
Just as one can find many situations which fit the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Game, one can also find countless examples of things in nature that can be simplified or
understood through a Cellular Automaton. One can use CA to simulate snowflakes, fluid
flow, neural activity, waves, ecosystems, diffusion, and more [19]. The simulations pre
sented in this thesis focus intensely on only the IPDG. If one wants to learn more about
Cellular Automata in general, I suggest reading Cellular Automata: A Discrete View o f the
World by Joel L. Schiff.
Finally there’s also some CA that leave the realm of immediate usefulness, but tell
us a lot about the possible origin of life and perhaps thought. John Conway’s Life, Brian
Silverman’s Wireworld, and John Von Neumann’s Self-Replicating Machine exhibit these
philosophical properties, and one must understand these concepts in order to analyze the
computation within the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Cellular Automaton.
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2.3

Universal Computation and Construction: Self-Replicating Ma
chines

John Von Neumann was the first to use CA to create a model for a self-replicating machine
[19]. Now the important question, what does it mean to be a self-replicating machine?
Imagine a machine which can create a copy of itself by piecing together resources found
around it. This machine contains not only the tools to build itself, but a method to copy
instructions for creating itself into its copy. In many ways, self-replication resembles the
process of reproduction, a key aspect of living organisms. This definition of self-replication
may even sound similar to the process of mitosis in some basic cells. Figure 5 shows Von
Neumann’s Universal Constructor reproducing itself.
Yet self-replication by itself fails to account for
some of the other aspects of organic life.

For exam

ple, many organisms move, gather resources, have a
metabolism, and do a wide array of things outside of just
existing and replicating. Thus Neumann’s CA also had
another special feature, Universal Computation. Some
thing with Universal Computation, also known as a Uni
versal Turing Machine, can compute any algorithm. An
algorithm of course is a “step-by-step procedure for reach
ing a clinical decision or diagnosis” [1]. Some examples
Figure 5:

Von Neumann’s of algorithms are simple things like breathing, eating, and

Universal Constructor

hunting in addition to running a computer. Each of these
actions requires a procedure that has the potential to termi

nate or reach a decision. In other words, each action has a potential halting state, even if
each action does not always definitively halt. Thus with the ability to run any algorithm or
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to make any decision, a self-replicating machine can do more complex things that resem
ble organic life. It can even evolve if it has programmed a mechanism for doing so, like
meiosis.
A Universal Turing Machine can simulate other things that exhibit Universal Com
putation, including self-replicating machines. For this reason, Universal Turing Machines
are the holy grail of CA theory. As one might imagine, they can be hard to understand and
even harder to find, but the philosophical consequences make them well worth the search.
If we look at Neumann’s CA as a metaphor for the complexity of the human brain we can
see how a large network of small neurons can create “complex behavior” [20] intrinsically
without any other unknown variable or force.
Unfortunately, John Von Neumann’s CA has a total of twenty nine states making
it a little cumbersome to understand. John Conway’s Game of Life on the other hand has
only two states, alive and dead, and it also exhibits Universal Computation. The Game of
Life works on a two-dimensional, square lattice, and it has the following simple rules [9]:
• Rule 1: If a cell is dead at time t it becomes alive at t + 1 if exactly three of its
neighbors were alive at t. Furthermore, it stays alive at t + 2 if and only if it has two
or three alive neighbors.
• Rule 2: If a cell is not alive, and it does not have three alive neighbors at t, it will
remain dead at t +1. Also, if a live cell has less than two or more than three neighbors
alive it will die due to exposure or overcrowding respectively.
Upon an initial read it may seem that this Cellular Automaton doesn’t do very much;
however, with many cells the Game of Life can achieve marvelous patterns on a holistic
level. One of the most important of these patterns is the Glider Gun in Figure 6 below.
The Glider Gun periodically creates a small formation of alive cells called a Glider
every 30 time steps. These gliders can travel in any diagonal direction, and in Figure 6
13
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Figure 6: A Glider Gun and Gliders in the Game of Life
these Gliders travel south east. What makes these gliders so special is that they can convey
information by their presence or absence. If we count a Glider as a binary 1, we can create
strings of information in the form of Gliders spaced out carefully. This means that the
Glider Gun spits out a constant stream of 1’s.
Even more interestingly, when two Gliders collide together in just the right way,
they erase each other turning into dead cells. This allows one to use a Glider gun to invert
a string of gliders that represents binary information, creating a N O T gate. Using similar
methods, one can also create a boolean A N D and an OR gate. Using these logic gates
in conjunction with the special properties of Glider Guns and Gliders themselves, one can
also create registers or memory. All we need to compute any binary algorithm is mem ory
and the A N D , OR, and N O T gates. Since we can compute any algorithm we know that
Life has Universal Computation.
Conway has also shown that one can create and destroy Glider Guns along with
other interesting and useful patterns. So, one can potentially construct a machine with a
high level of complexity, as the collision of gliders seems capable of making an innumer
able number of patterns. Though it may not seem immediately apparent, one can even
simulate Von Neumann’s CA.
Amazingly enough, with only two states and relatively simple rules, one can create
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patterns that act like self replicating “animals”. Obviously, with infinite time steps and infi
nite space, these organisms are bound to appear naturally, albeit very far and few between.
The implications this model has for organic life are immense, as Conway says:
“Analogies with real life processes are impossible to resist. If a primor
dial broth of amino-acids is large enough, and there is sufficient time, selfreplicating moving automata may result from transition rules built into the
structure of matter and the laws of nature.” [9]
For Cellular Automata enthusiasts, the Game of Life almost represents a metaphor
ical proof for the origin of life or complex reproducing entities. The game of Life most
certainly proves this point by example through its various holistic configurations. Wolfram
also shows the potentiality of self-replicating Machines in Class 4 CA[21].
In addition to the CA already mentioned, there exists CA aesthetically closer to a
computer than a biological entity. A good example of this is Wire World [19]. Wire World
focuses on creating cells that move like electronic signals on a wire; however, the cellular
automaton lacks any way to place new wire cells, and in that way it can only simulate
replication as an algorithm inside itself. In other words, a Turing machine made in Wire
World can compute any algorithm, but just like modern computers, it lacks a method for
building glider guns or other important patterns onto itself.
Now that we have an understanding of this powerful tool and the Iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma Game, we need an elegant way to combine these two theories to make our own
cool Cellular Automata simulation.

2.4

A Review on Literature for the IPDG CA

A couple of recent studies (in addition to Axelrod’s old one) have created their own PDG
CA experiments. First Nowak and May studied simulations without memory, where the
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agents either always defected or cooperated [16]. Similar to this thesis, Nowak and May
created interesting results by tweaking a few of the variables in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Game. Specifically they set R = 1, T = b (b > 1), and S = P = 0. This does not
necessarily violate the definition of the PDG, T > R > P > S . I t assumes that P = e
where e is so small it essentially acts the same way as 0. Then by experimentally setting b
to different values, Nowak and May found spacial chaos with a variety of different objects
similar to the Game of Life: rotators, gliders, blinkers, and eaters.
In their paper they implemented a network of cooperators and defectors in a square
lattice similar to the one used in this thesis. They tried hexagonal lattices, but it didn’t
necessarily add to the experiment(everything one could find in a hexagonal lattice, one
could probably find in the square lattice). Similarly in this paper, one lattice will create
robust results.
Next, Nowak, May and Sigmund created another simulation closer to the one’s we
will explore and Axelrod’s original computer tournaments [17]. This time around they
focused on the rules Always Cooperate, Always Defect, Tit-for-Tat, and Pavlov. The
Pavlov rule switches from cooperation to defection or defection to cooperation only when
it makes a poor amount of points the turn before (either S or P ). Pavlov created some semiinteresting results; however, unlike Tit-for-Tat, its strategy leads to cooperating every other
move with a rule that always defects, essentially halving its own points while rewarding
defectors. Overall, their research concluded that cooperation persists as a viable strategy in
a simulation focused on spatial structures; furthermore, it can exist side by side with other
strategies that defect, creating diversity.
Recently Pereira and Martinez [18] also investigated the Prisoner’s Dilemma game
using a similar method as Nowak and May, except Pereira and Martinez focused on a Pavlovian Evolutionary Strategy transition rule, where a cell will change from a cooperator to a
defector or vice versa similar to the Pavlov rule mentioned in the previous paragraph. This
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is in contrast to what they call a Darwinian Evolutionary Strategy that works essentially the
same way as Nowak and Mays’ and mine. (The rule for transitions is in the next section.)
Again, by changing the value of T , the temptation for defection, Pereira and Martinez also
found emergent complexity in their random simulations with objects such as gliders and
“fingers”. They describe the point at which complexity emerges as the quasi-regular phase.
Unlike the previous research, this thesis focuses on the number of iterations per time
step on a lattice of cells that all have memory. In fact, my research more closely resembles
one of the rules in Axelrod’s original computer tournaments called NYDEGGER [4]. This
rule used a look up table of the opponent’s previous three moves in order to pick a response
for the next move. One can extend the look up table concept to create a method for defining
all kinds of cells with different strategies as a number.
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3
3.1

Playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game with Memory
Giving Each Player “Instructions”

What if one wants to implement the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (IPDG) in a Cellular
Automata (CA) environment without individually coding hundreds, maybe thousands of
strategies for playing the game? Individually coding thousands of rules is not pretty; put
succinctly, no one wants to see that mess. Luckily, I devised a general method that has
agents playing the IPDG using different strategies based off of the opponent’s memory.
First, I must introduce some rules that act on the players:
• Rule 1: Players only remember opponent’s moves, not their own. They lack intro
spectiveness.
• Rule 2: Players can remember more than one move (called a history).
• Rule 3: Players have a defined action for every possibly history of opponent’s moves.
These rules allow us to create agents that deterministically react to any history of an
opponent’s moves. By deterministic, I mean that any set of actions will cause a predictable
reaction. So if our agent cooperated with an opponent who decides to defect, cooperate,
and then defect again, I would expect that agent to always cooperate with any opponent
who decides to defect, cooperate, and then defect. Why don’t our players react to their own
moves? In many social situations with a low amount of iterations, players may pay more
attention to the opponent’s actions than their own. As an example, Tit for Tat does not
take into account its own moves, and it doesn’t need to. Intrinsically, it follows the Golden
Rule; however, other strategies may benefit from knowing their own moves. A strategy that
defects and essentially “pisses off” another strategy may benefit from remembering its own
moves, but for simplicity’s sake, this simulation leaves out this device.
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Say our agent could also remember its own moves; if so, it could also use every
deterministic strategy possible for two agents in the IPDG. If we modify rule 1 (Make it
this: players can remember all moves), this becomes clear. By rule 3, let f (H ) : H ^
{cooperate, defect}* be a function that maps a history to the decision to cooperate or
defect. Every deterministic strategy will make the same move, either cooperate or defect,
each time for a specific history (no matter how complex). Thus we can convert every
deterministic strategy into a well defined function, f (H ).
At this point we can look at groups of strategies playing the IPDG as sets. First
we have the set of all un-deterministic strategies, U, that don’t rely on memory, like the
random strategy. Second we have the set of all deterministic strategies, D, that do rely on
memory. Together they make the set of all strategies, A, and U (J D = A. The set of all
strategies that remember only the opponent’s moves, D', is a subset of D. Furthermore, all
strategies that remember only n E N moves, D'', is a subset of D ' . All together, this forms
the composition D" C D ' C D C A. The Venn diagram in Figure 7 below shows this
composition with n = 3.

Figure 7: Composition of Strategy Types
In our CA simulations we’ll focus on strategies that can remember the past three
moves of the opponent. Using a number convention similar to those used to define simple
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2D CA by Wolfram [21], one can describe a strategy using binary by assigning cooperation
the value 1, and defection 0. Table 4 uses Tit for Tat to demonstrate the numbering scheme.
Table 4 will work perfectly when it has
Tit For Tat

played at least three iterations of the PDG with an

Opponent’s History

C /D

opponent. Notice that Tit for Tat only cares about

00 0

|0

the most recent move, copying it, but it ignores the

00 1

11

previous two moves highlighted in yellow. This

01 0

|0

means that Tit for Tat has a memory of 1 iteration,

01 1

11

which causes a repeating pattern of 1, 0, 1, 0, etc.

10 0

|0

Notice that this strategy lacks information for what

|10 1

11

to do after only two iterations, one iteration, and

11 0

|0

if it should cooperate or defect for its first round.

1111

11

After a strategy has played more than three itera-

Table 4: 3 Memory Transient Strategy tions (four iterations, five, etc.), it can always use
for Tit for Tat

the past three moves of the opponent to determine
what to do, thus Table 4 describes the long term,

asymptotic behavior. In order to define the initial behavior we need something that de
scribes the transient.
Transient or initial instructions are only used during the beginning and then never
used again. However, one should not disregard the transient interactions, because they
deterministically influence the rest of moves that two strategies will make. The instructions
that take over for all moves past 3 are the asymptotic. Similar to the word for asymptote,
the asymptotic controls the long term trends of a particular strategy. Table 5 contains both
the asymptotic, and the transient.
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Strategy 10818
Opp. H.

C /D

0000

0

000 1

1

00 1 0

0

00 1 1

0

0 1 00

0

0 1 01

0

0 1 10

1

0 1 11

0

1 1000

0

1 1001

1

1 1010

0

Table 5 defines what to do for the first, second , and third
moves, as well as what to do for every move after that. The yellow
bit’s position defines what iteration the green bit responds to. No
tice that only one row has “000 1 ”, since this row represents the
first move. Two rows start with “00 1 ”, since the opponent has
two optional histories for the second move highlighted in blue.
Similarly four rows start with “0 1 ” for the third move, and eight
rows start with “ 1 ” for the eight possible histories for moves four
and beyond. The first row in Figure 5 remains a “0”, and this bit
isn’t used. The green bits, by instructing a cell what to do in cer
tain situations(cooperate or defect), creates “instructions” for how
the cell should act.
To get the strategy number, or 10818 in this example, con
vert the left column of Table 5 from binary to base 10 (0000 ^

1 1011

1

1 1100

0

1 1101

1

1 1110

0

1 111

0

0, 0001 ^ 1, 0010 ^ 2,..., 1111 ^ 15). The number in the left
column represents the position of the bits that define the strategy
from rightmost (0) to leftmost (15). Once we order our bits we get
0010101001000010. Convert this number to base 10 (Figure 8) in
order to get a strategy number. Using this method we can represent

Table 5:

3 Memory
each possible strategy with its own unique number.

Asymptotic and TranCreating a strategy number creates an easy way to implesient Strategy
ment many different deterministic strategies, and it has advantages
when displaying different strategies in the CA simulation. When creating a random simula
tion, the computer can pick a random number that maps to a strategy, and then the computer
can also assign each strategy a unique color using a one-to-one function that maps numbers
to colors. The simulations analyzed below will use many different colors to display the vast
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number of strategies.
0 ■215 + 0 ■214 + 1 ■213 + 0 ■212 + 1 ■211 + 0 ■210 + 1 ■29 + 0 ■28 + 0 ■27 + 1 ■26 + 0 ■
25 + 0 ■24 + 0 ■23 + 0 ■22 + 1 ■21 + 0 ■20
= 10818
Figure 8: Converting to Base 10 to Make a Strategy Number
Now lets test our instructions for strategy 10818 against Tit for Tat or strategy
43690. Refer to Equation (3) in Figure 2 on page 6 for a description of the functional
notations. Let a = strategy 10818 and b = strategy 43690. Both a and b cooperate during
the first round, so g(a,b) = g(b, a) = 3, and both a and b get 3 points. During the second
iteration b (Tit fo r Tat) will cooperate again since a cooperated; however, this turn a will
defect (notice that a always defects on the second iteration). On the third iteration, b will
defect since a defected, and a, referring to its two memory asymptotic instructions for the
history 11, will also defect. For the fourth iteration, b will defect again, and a will refer to
its transient instructions for the history 110, and it will defect again. Every iteration after
this, both a and b will defect. Notice, in this example f (a, b,n) = 8 + (n — 2 ) , n > 1. This
is very close to the results of Equation (7), meaning that strategy 10818 barely makes more
than the smallest payoff possible from Tit for Tat.
So how many different strategies can one make with a memory of three moves?
Ignoring the first row(since this row doesn’t hold any information), we have 15 rows that
contain either defect, 0, or cooperate, 1. Since each row has two options, we have 215
different possible strategies or 32, 768. Due to the method of creating a strategy number,
strategies will have all the even numbers from 0 to 65, 536.

3.2

Constructing the Lattice

Axelrod first implemented the IPDG in a CA simulation with the goal of testing Tit for
Tat’s robustness [4]. Interestingly enough, he found that Tit for Tat didn’t excel in the CA
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simulations as well as it did in other simulations, and more often a rule called NYDEGGER
often excelled. NYDEGGER used an algorithm based off of the opponent’s previous three
moves that sounds similar if not identical to some of the strategies created by our simu
lation. In order to understand why some rules thrive, one must first understand the exact
environment in which a rule fights for survival.
The simulations used in the following chapters implement a Moore Neighborhood
on a 2D lattice. Figure 9 shows some of the different kinds of neighborhoods that one may
use for a cellular automaton. Keep in mind that Figure 9 represents just 4 common neigh
borhoods, whereas the number of lattices and neighborhoods are theoretically infinite. To
an extent, a scientist can arbitrate the choice of what type of neighborhood to use. Each
cell, representing a player, must interact with multiple cells; furthermore, a neighborhood
must restrict a cell’s interactions such that it can only interact with cells nearby. Martinez
and Pereira attained similar results when finding an ideal “phase” in their paper “Pavlovian
Prisoner’s Dilemma-Analytical Results, the Quasi-Regular Phase and Spatio-Temporal Pat
terns” [18], and they used a 1-D lattice instead of the 2-D lattice we will choose here.

Figure 9: A Few Different types of Neighborhoods

In addition to choosing a lattice, we must also have a simple rule that determines
how a cell changes states. Referring again to Axelrod’s initial setup, our rule picks the
next state/strategy by changing a cell’s current state to that of the neighbor with the highest
points [4]. If a neighbor does not have a higher point value, then the cell will not want to
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change states. Therefore, in the case of a tie between a cell and it’s neighbor, a cell will
keep it’s own rule. In order to keep our simulations deterministic and symmetrical around
the square, the rule ignores all other ties. In the case of a tie between two neighboring
cells, a cell will retain its own rule. Fortunately, this circumstance does not arise often in
simulations, and has no noticeable effects; furthermore, keeping the rule for state changes
deterministic offers more control in determining the outcome of a particular initial setup of
cells.
From this point on, a random initial state refers to a n x m lattice of cells that have
one of the 215 deterministic strategies. One must now wonder, how do we determine that a
lattice has at least one cell for each strategy? The lower the odds of representing a certain
cell, the more inconsistencies one should expect between the results of different random
initial states. Thus, one needs a function that will compute the odds of a single particular
strategy existing in a random initial state. Figure 10 contains this function, equation (10).
First, examine the case where our lattice has one cell. This one cell will randomly take one
of our 215 strategies, and the odds of having any one strategy is equation (8). Next, examine
the case where our lattice has two cells. Take the odds of having any one strategy from the
previous equation, and add to it the odds that a chosen strategy does not occur in the first
cell times the likelihood that it will appear in the next cell, or equation (9). By extending
these two examples to the odds of a single strategy occurring in a lattice with j cells, we
derive the geometric series in equation (10).
Many random initial states used in the future consist of an 800 x 600 lattice. This
lattice has 480,000 cells, and equation (11) shows that the odds of having at least one
of each strategy are exceptionally high. In most simulations, one can assume that each
strategy has had a chance to compete based on its existence in the initial state.
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3.05- 10-5
1
215 — 1
+
/ n i r: \ o
215
(215)2
!1 £

6.10 10-5

(8)
(9)

(10)
P(480, 000) = 0.99999957

(11)

Figure 10: Odds of Having a Single Strategy in a Random Initial State

3.3

One Interesting Consequence

Two crucial rules from the previous section have some non-intuitive effects on simulations,
and these effects will also affect how strategies create barriers between each other. First,
a strategy sums up all the points it receives from its Moore neighborhood. Next, it looks
at all of its neighbors, and it picks the one with the most points and copies its strategy.
Imagine we have rules A , B , and C where A is B ’s neighbor (and vice versa), B is C ’s
neighbor, but A is not C ’s neighbor. C always defects, which brings down B ’s score. When

A compares scores surrounding it, it will see that B has a lower score, and A will pick a
different strategy for its next state. This example shows that even though A is not C ’s
neighbor, C affects whether or not A takes on B ’s strategy; furthermore the neighbors of
the neighbors of A, also known as A ’s second neighbors, affect its next state and strategy.
Figure 11 demonstrates this case example.
Both of the initial configurations for this simulation are the same except for the
cell circled in black. Both start with a 10 x 10 lattice, and each cell plays 10 iterations
of the game with its neighbors each round. In the second simulation, the cell circled in
black has the strategy 0 instead of strategy 18078. The cell with strategy 0 always defects,
bringing down the score of the cells next to it. This effects the next state of the cell circled
in white. In the first simulation, the cell circled in white takes on the strategy of its neighbor
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Initial State

After 1 Round

After 10 rounds

h

Ik f

Figure 11: The Effects of the Second Neighbor
to the left, strategy 36020. Strategy 36020 goes on to take over the whole lattice after just
ten rounds. In the second simulation, strategy 0 brings down the score of strategy 36020,
which leads our cell circled in white to take on the strategy 9268 instead. After ten rounds,
strategy 17540 takes over the lattice instead.
The actual strategy numbers do not matter as much in this example, as the fact
that small initial changes affect second neighbors and the final state of the lattice. In future
(more interesting) simulations, we will see how second neighbors create a wave or invisible
force field of point densities around cells.
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4
4.1

Patterns, Fractals, and Grouping
Creating Order Out of the Randomness

Figure 12: A 800x600 Random Initial Configuration

When beginning a simulation from a random initial state(Figure 12), one must de
fine many variables. To start, one must define T , R, P , and S (See Table 2). Many ex
periments focus on tweaking the values of either T , R, P , or S to create complexity. In
Martin A. Nowak and Robert M. M ay’s Evolutionary Games and Spacial Chaos, they
achieved both static and dynamic patterns such as their “evolutionary kaleidoscope” by
setting 2 > T > 1.8, R = 1 ,S = 0 and P extremely close to S [16]. Marcelo Alves
Pereira and Alexandre Souto Martinez found spatio-temporal patterns in 1-dimensional

27

cellular automata by also tweaking T , R, P , and S [18]. Despite this interesting research,
all simulations here will use the generic values T = 5, R = 3 , S = 1 , and P = 0.
However, wanting to ensure interesting results one must tweak a variable that will
allow at least a little bit of randomness in our IPDG simulations. Luckily, our strategies
have memory, and when dealing with strategies that have a memory another important
variable affects how the cells interact. The number of iterations each cell plays between
each round controls how much a cell relies on either its asymptotic or transient memory.
At minimum for a strategy with a memory of 3, a simulation must require the cells to do 4
iterations to take advantage of all of the transient: 1 iteration for the first move followed by
3 iterations to use the transient memory. After 4 iterations, the cell relies on its asymptotic
memory for the past three moves. So when we set the number of rounds, what we really
care about is the ratio of transient rounds to asymptotic. W hat ratio will give us interesting
results?
Here comes the science. Empirically running many simulations and gathering data
creates a way to find a good ratio, and there exists a few good indicators of whether or not
a simulation will converge to a homogenous (boring) or mixed (ideal) steady state.
First, examine the Hamming Distance in Figure 13, which measures how many
cells switch strategies each round. The following graphs show the Hamming Distance for
different simulations ran from a 800 x 600 random initial state. The x-axis and the y-axis
represents the time step and population of cells that have changed strategy respectively.
Immediately one can see that the Hamming Distance for playing the game with only
4 iterations converges at a much higher number than the simulations that had 5 iterations
or more. After 750 time steps the six simulations sampled for 4 iterations averaged a Ham
ming Distance of 2538 or .0053% of the total population. Even though this may seem like a
very small percentage of the population, compared to the more asymptotic simulations it’s
huge! From 5 to 9 iterations, the simulations averaged a Hamming Distance of 211, 295,
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Figure 13: The Hamming Distance
89, 63, and 77 after 750 time steps.
Also notice how in all of the simulations, the Hamming Distance initially starts out
high, and then eventually it slopes out sharply. A log-log plot of the 4 iteration simulations
reveals strong evidence that one can approximate the hamming distance over time-steps
with the function, f (x) = 393560 ■x -0 79645 (R 2 = 0.8986). (In contrast, a log-linear plot
shows that the data does not take the form f (x) = cax where c,a e R.) One can look at
Hamming Distance as the amount of energy or movement in a system. When Hamming
Distance decreases, one can interpret this as an increase of static neighborhoods in the sys
tem. From here we can form a hypothesis that the optimal number of iterations exploits
only the transient and none of the asymptotic, since simulations with a low Hamming Dis
tance might represent more homogenous groups. Examining the simulations individually
seems to confirm this.
In Figure 14 one can see many complex groupings made of several different rules
from one of the 4 iteration simulations. It has a good amount of diversity and randomness.
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Upon close inspection, if one examines the southern area of the simulation, there’s a per
sistent formation of gliders bouncing, colliding, and producing more gliders. Gliders could
lead to a proof that the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma CA has Computational Universality.

Figure 14: 4 Iteration Simulation After 750 Rounds

Now lets examine our simulations by the number of initial cooperators versus the
number of initial defectors at each time step. Initially one might think this would also test
for diversity; however, the simulations created some rather unexpected results. Table 6
shows the average results for 6 simulations ran for 4, 5, ..., 10 iterations.
Iterations
Percentage

4
91.8%

5
96.1%

6
94.4%

7
93.4%

8
89.5%

9
87.4%

Table 6: Average Percentage of Initial Cooperators
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10
83.0%

Contrary to what one would expect according to the Hamming Distance results, as
the number of iterations increases the number of initial cooperators actually decreases and
the number of defectors increases. Though simulations with higher iterations have a more
static, less diverse population, it seems that strategies that initially defect can take advantage
of initial cooperators early in the game and eventually group together creating borders that
cooperative rules cannot invade into. Figure 15 shows some of these groups of defectors.
The initial defectors have a red or orange tint to them while the initial cooperators have a
blue or green tint.

Figure 15: 9 Iteration Simulation After 750 Rounds

Of course, more defectors may also mean a lower total percentage of the highest
possible amount of points for the population. Remember that the highest amount of points
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that two players can get collectively in a round is 6 if both choose to cooperate. This means
the highest amount of points in a simulation equals 3 •8 •p •i where p is the number of players
or cells and i is the number of iterations (remember that each cell plays 8 times, once with
each of its 8 neighbors). Also keep in mind that this number looks at how the population
does as a whole and not at individuals who can make up to 5 • 8 • i points. Table 7 shows
the average percentage of total points that simulations achieved at different iterations.
Iterations
Percentage

4
92.6%

5
97.9%

6
98.0%

7
98.3%

8
98.1%

9
97.8%

10
97.6%

Table 7: Average Percentage of Population Points

Strangely enough, the percentage of possible points seems to increase until it reaches
7 or 8 iterations, and then it slowly starts to recede. However, for the most part the total
percentage of possible points stays fairly high for all simulations, which may mean that
the only initial defecting strategies that can survive have very cooperative asymptotic prop
erties. This also makes initial defection a feasible strategy. If one assumes this simula
tion emulates daily interactions, this validates a strategy whereby people can indeed defect
whether through rudeness or another social force to people they have only initially met, so
long as they cooperate later.
4 Iterations

10 Iterations

Wm_ fP^
Figure 16: Cooperating Instructions over Iterations
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Finally, one can also look at the fitness of cooperating or defecting on a particular
instruction. Figure 16 shows two graphs that trace the popularity for a strategy to cooperate
for a particular history over time (time steps) on a 800 x 600 lattice. The left axis represents
the number of strategies cooperating for a certain history (note that the maximum number
of strategies cooperating for a given history is 480, 000). The bottom axis represents the
history as defined in Section 3 earlier. The right axis represents the time, with the most
recent time step in the front.
This method of gathering data on the simulations can help us intuit an ideal compos
ite strategy made up of the most popular instructions for a given population. By comparing
simulations with different iterations per time step, we can also see how the popularity of
cooperating for one history changes when we shift emphasis to the asymptotic memory. In
both the 4 iteration and 10 iteration simulations successful strategies almost always coop
erate initially as well as when the opponent has always cooperated; furthermore, in both
we should always defect when the opponent has defected three times in a row.
The main difference between the transient simulation, and the more asymptotic sim
ulation reveal some interesting patterns. As the number of iterations increases, a strategy
needs to cooperate more in the transient stage in order to survive; however, it should also
cooperate less when the opponent has not cooperated historically for the past three moves
in the asymptotic memory. Using this information, we can try to create ad hoc a strategy
that I'd call Unforgiving Tit for Tat. As long as Unforgiving Tit for Tat remembers an
opponent defecting, it will defect, otherwise it cooperates. Unfortunately, this interesting
result does not belong within the scope of this paper (see Section 7).
Overall, these evaluations have led to the conclusion that the transient parts of an
IPDG strategy lead to complexity and perhaps Universal Computation. The simulations
that follow all use only 4 iterations unless specified otherwise.
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4.2

How Groups Form

Looking at Figure 14, one can see that simulations eventually reach a mostly stable state
where many different groups of strategies live side by side. One might wonder why doesn’t
one strategy eventually end up dominating the whole simulation? In order to understand
this we must look carefully at the borders between two competing strategies. Figure 17
shows a stabilized group of strategies on the top, and the points that they receive in grey
scale on the bottom. The lighter the area is, the more points players received.
The cells with the lighter blue color
in the middle of the trapezoidal shape use
the strategy 38538. The green colored cells
have the strategy 41058, and the darker
bluish color on the right border of that has
strategy 33418.

To make this easier, let

strategy A = 38538, B = 41058, and
C = 33418. Most of the A cells make 96
points every time step, except for the ones
right along the border. On the right side of
the grouping of A, a border of strategy B
keeps A and C separated; however the line
created by B only makes 92 points and 80

Figure 17: Point View

points based on if it interacts with A or C.
However, when B interacts with A or C it lowers their points so much, that on the next time
step it will choose itself as the best strategy. Using equation (3) from figure 2 on page 6,
we can understand this as a set of equalities.
For simplicity’s sake, these inequalities ignore the number of neighbors each round,
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but it still follows the general idea. First, B excels relatively whenever it faces A or C, so
f (A, B, 4) < f (B, A, 4) and f (C, B , 4) < f (B, C, 4); however, A and C do better when
matched with their own kind than with B , so f (B, A, 4) < f (A, A, 4) and f (B, C, 4) <
f (C, C, 4). B defects in such a way that it can persist by lowering the scores of opposing
rules, but it can’t invade either A or C since both A and C exert a force field of points over
their domain. Thus borders and groups form.
Say we had strategies D and E , such that f (D ,E , 4) < f ( E ,E , 4) and f (D ,D , 4) <
f (E , D , 4). Here, strategy E will push and invade into D no matter what, and a stable
grouping of D will never persist; however, what if we introduce a new strategy F ? This
D can invade F , but F has a strategy that invades E , creating a rock-paper-scissors effect.
With the addition of F we can create more complex moving objects in a simulation. All
we have to do is initialize our lattice with a specific formation of strategies.

4.3

Interesting Results
When running random simulations, interesting for
mations of strategies will often develop from the
randomness. If one looks closely at Figure 14 on
page 30 towards the bottom there’s an interesting
patch of red and navy blue dots on a teal back
ground. Figure 18 zooms in on this peculiar for
mation.
This actually happens to be a glider gun,
Figure 18: A Natural Gun

and the little worm looking thing on the upper-right

hand side is a glider. Just like Conway’s Life, with enough space interesting objects emerge;
however, though this hints that the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma CA can perform Universal
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Computation, proving it will take a lot more work.
Isolating certain strategies together increases the chances for interesting behavior
like the Glider Gun. By combining strategies 11196, 36866, and 1088 in a specific initial
configuration one can make a “program” that recursively builds the Sierpinski triangle.
Figure 19 shows the initial setup on the left, and different time steps of the simulation as
the triangle forms itself. The bottom represents how many points each cell playing the
IPDG makes, forming the triangle.

Figure 19: An Emergent Sierpinski Triangle

Each of the triangles in this simulation create a point which upholds a wall going
to the right and to the left of it. This wall has the pink, 11196, filling underneath it, which
then invades the green rule 36866. As 1088 invades from the sides, creating a triangle, it
cuts off smaller walls which create even more triangles. The whole process creates quite a
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mesmerizing visual.
The ability to tame the IPDG CA simulation to create a fractal builds upon a hy
pothesis that perhaps we can create controllable initial configurations in the IPDG capable
of Universal Computation. However, in order to create a proof for Universal Computation,
one needs more than a pretty fractal since many CA capable of creating fractals can not
compute everything. Specifically, one needs a way to transmit and store information, as
well as a way to make logic gates.
An interesting case example comes from the two-memory
strategies 8748 (in red), 34954 (in blue), and 8746 (in black). This
versatile set of rules can make many interesting patterns, the first
of which can produce little bullet and wave like objects. Figures 20
and 21 show these three rules competing with only three iterations
in order to avoid transient behavior.
In both these simulations, the black colored strategy sepa
rates the red and the blue creating walls, and it also creates move
ment based on how one strategically places it. Figure 20 relies
on making small walls of blue and black in order to produce a
bullet. For the most part, combinations of the strategies existing
in the lattice do not have the power to penetrate into these walls.
The walls keep in a spiral at the top that periodically shoots out a
bullet, whose width the walls also determine. Unfortunately these
bullets do not destroy themselves upon collision like the gliders in
the game of Life. Also, when they leave the walls, they spread in Figure 20: The Wave
all directions forming a wave.

Gun

Figure 21 uses the same three rules, but with a slightly different approach. Using
the blue strategy for the background instead of the red one, one can easily make something
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that looks more like a glider gun. From top-left to bottom right, Figure 21 shows each time
step of the creation of a glider.

Figure 21: The Three Iteration Gun

Unfortunately, upon collision these gliders also persist, and often the collisions
create a great amount of unpredictable randomness. The bottom-right image of Figure 21
shows the only way to destroy a glider, by colliding four going in opposite directions all at
the same time. So though the simulation can produce gliders and transmit information, it
can’t create the logic gates fundamental to Universal Computation.
Luckily, a few sets of three-memory rules interacting with four iterations can create
a special glider which does destroy itself upon impact with another glider. But as this sec
tion shows, one can find many different combinations of strategies which have interesting
properties. One can also create strategies ad hoc, in order to create specific interactions. In
this way our IPDG CA excels in versatility.
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5
5.1

Proof of Universal Computation
Creating a NAND gate

Figure 22: Randomness Capable of Universal Computation
While running several different random simulations, an interesting group of strate
gies appeared. Figure 22 shows how three of these strategies interact with each other. In the
random initial setup shown, many gliders appear. These gliders hold the key to Universal
Computation.
Figure 23 shows one of these gliders in action. The
basic setup of strategies to make a glider follows. Using
strategy 10818 as a background, the slightly darker 5218
forms a head that invades into 10818. The pink looking
Figure 23: A Glider

strategy 3464 eats up 5218, preventing it from traveling
diagonally in both directions. On the right of figure 23 the

point view shows a cell with a lot of points(light grey) which advances the pink square each
time step. If examined closely, the head of the glider moves by lowering the points of the
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background strategy in front of it, while giving the lower-right most cell of the head just
slightly more points than the other cells around it.
Another object, though not shown in Figure 22, can
eat and redirect gliders. Figure 24 shows a “pin” made
up of strategy 33002 . 33002 cooperates with itself, which
allows it to achieve a high amount of points each time step
Figure 24: A “Pin”

if its neighbors have the same strategy. On the left we have
a basic 3 x 3 square of 33002. On the right, the point view

of the same object shows the high amount of points a cell makes in the middle of the square.
Now if a glider runs into two of these pins placed very carefully, the glider will
die due to a force field of points made from the background off of the light blue strategy

33002. Figure 25 shows one of these glider eaters in action. Notice that the glider begins
to die two cells before coming into contact with the eater. This may seem strange at first,
but remember that the pins create a force field of high points on the background, making it
impossible for a rule to invade or even touch the pins.

Figure 25: A Glider Eater
In order to finding Universal Computation, the gliders must interact either with each
other or with the environment in such a way that one can create logic gates. Figure 26 shows
what happens when two gliders collide orthogonal to each other. Conveniently enough,
these gliders take each other out when they collide in a manner similar to the game of Life.
From here a proof of Universal Computation follows similarly to that of Life, if we can
create a “glider gun” .
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Figure 26: Collision Between Two Gliders
An interesting phenomenon happens when we have a glider collide with one pin
at just the right angle. Figure 27 shows a glider colliding on the edge of a pin. The pin
actually pulls the glider into itself, making the glider swerve around the pin; furthermore,
the glider swerving around the pin then starts to produce more gliders in every direction!
Eureka! This is a glider gun, and with some strategic placing of more pins we can control
its output.

Figure 27: Glider Hooked on a Pin

Now that we know how the gliders interact and now that we know how to make a
glider gun, we can now start making logic gates. In order to prove Universal Computation
we actually only need to make one kind of logic gate, the NAND. The NAND gate com
bines a NOT gate with an AND gate. Table 8 shows how the NAND gate works (Notice
that © means NAND here). Notice that one can create the boolean AND, OR, and NOT
gate as well. This means that all we need to find to display the logic gate requirement of
Universal Computation is an example of a NAND gate.
Figure 28 shows the before and after of a NAND gate simulation. The pink lines
should help the reader understand the data stream and their direction, but they are not part
of the simulation. On the top row, starting from the lower-right hand side, we have two
gliders in the same stream. Notice that the absence of a glider also conveys information.
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x
0
0
1
1

y
0
1
0

1

x ©y
1
1
1
0

(x © y) © (x © y)
0
0
0
1
= AND

(x © x) © (y © y)
0
1
1
1
= OR

x ©x
1
1
0
0
= NOT

Table 8: The NAND Gate
We can assign a glider the binary value 1, and the absence of a glider a 0. So the top row
will feed in starting from the bottom a 0, 1, 0, and finally a 1. The bottom row will feed in
a 1, 1, 0, 0.

Figure 28: A NAND Gate made out of IPDG Players

The first glider gun creates gliders which will collide with the incoming streams. If
only one glider enters, the glider gun will block it, making the output a 0. Similarly if no
gliders go in, none will come out. In the special case when two gliders try to enter at the
same time, the glider gun will only block one of them letting the other slip through. Thus
we must have two 1’s entering to get a 1 out. This is our AND gate.
The second glider gun creates our NOT gate. This time the gliders from the gun
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not only block the gliders input into it, but it also creates the output. If a glider enters, it’ll
destroy one from the gun. Thus a 1 will create a 0, and if nothing enters it outputs a 1.
After going through the AND and the NOT gate, we should get a 1, 0, 1, and a 1.
On the right of Figure 28 we have just that. Now all we need to show is that we can also
store memory in this simulation, and luckily all this requires is some everyday knowledge
of Digital Design.

5.2

Making a Computer

Today’s computers work with a very smart device
called a transistor. Similar to our gliders, transistors
act as gates to manipulate voltages. Since we can
reduce the input and outputs made with transistors to
logic gates, we should be able to produce anything a
transistor can make with our gliders and glider guns.
So lets make some cool stuff!
First, though we can make every gate using
just the NAND gate, the difficulty of making basic
gates with a NAND makes finding smaller substi
tutes a fruitful activity. Figure 29 contains both an
OR gate(top) and an XOR gate(bottom). The OR
gate receives two gliders going in the same direction,
and combines them into one stream by using pins
to rotate one 90 degrees into the same path as the
other. Remarkably, when two gliders collide while
rotating, they simply combine instead of dying. This
Figure 29: OR and XOR Gates
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makes creating an XOR gate very easy. First a ro
tator takes gliders from one stream and purposefully
collides that glider with another. Then three more rotators combine the two path ways into
one.
The XOR will come in handy since in both digital design and here we need the
ability to cross paths. In digital design we can simply make one wire or pathway go over
or overlap another. Our two-dimensional environment will push us to be more creative.
Table 9 shows how to use XOR(© means XOR here) to cross signals. First create a shared
stream, x © y, then using a copy of the y signal derive x by XORing the result of the shared
stream.
x
0
0
1
1

y
0

1
0

1

x ©y
0
1
1
0

(x © y) © x
0
1
0
1

(x © y) © y
0
0
1
1

Table 9: Properties of XOR

Now that we have these tools, lets create the missing piece to our proof for Universal
Computation, memory. Figure 30 shows a D latch in Cellular Automata form. Usually in
a computer, one can create a register by placing two D latches together back to back. A
register forms a safe way to store and retrieve bits getting consistent results; however, half
a register works just fine for proving that the IPDG can hold memory.
I have labeled many of the major components in pink. First notice that the clock
and the D input both get split into two paths, with the XORs crossing them. Then at the
bottom we NOT the D and AND it with the clock input. The clock has a cycle of 11 gliders
“on” then 11 gliders “off”. At the top, the D and the clock get ANDed together as well.
This guarantees that the leftover latch will receive only one signal at a time. If it receives a
signal from the top, the latch ORs it and then NOTs it, saving the value “ 1” in a loop. The
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Figure 30: D Latch with a “0”
same happens when a signal gets fed to the bottom; except the opposite side of the loop
will turn on. Figure 30 shows the D latch in its initial configuration. Eventually, since it
has no input going into it, this latch will save a “0”. Figure 31 shows the same simulation,
but with a glider gun feeding an input of “ 1” into the input path. When both D and the
clock output “ 1” at the same time, the value gets saved into the latch. As w e’d expect, the
simulation with gliders in the D input, also has gliders in the output.
Now that we have a case example for how to construct memory, we have proven that
the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game has Universal Computation on a Cellular Automata
Lattice. □ So what does this mean?
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Figure 31: D Latch with a “ 1”

5.3

What this Proof Means

This proof shows partially by construction the existence of Universal Computation in a
subset of the strategies for playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. With infinite pins and
infinite space one could definitely compute any algorithm, and this includes algorithms that
self-replicate. Due to the static placement of pins, this Cellular Automata seems similar to
Wireworld in its strict placement of paths for the gliders; however, this proof has similarities
with the proof for Universal Computation in Conway’s Life(see Section 2.3).
This proof does not show all the possible ways to create a Universal Turing Ma
chine. In fact several sets of strategies seem to create similar gliders or other ways of trans
mitting information. The possible number of combinations of strategies that one could try
is inexhaustible; however, often in the small (800 x 600) random initial configurations com
binations of strategies that look like a Universal Computer usually emerge, and sometimes
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persist after 700 times steps. Remember the natural glider gun in Figure 18 on page 18?
The following gun in Figure 32, the glider, and eaters are made up of all the same stuff.
The gliders made from this gun destroy themselves upon collision; therefore, a proof for
its Universal Computation will work similarly to the proof for the set of strategies above.
Who knows how many other interesting computers might exist among the combinations of
strategies!

*
t

*

■+■

j,

Figure 32: A Glider Gun without pins

This proof for Universal Computation, like the other ones (review Section 2.3),
has quite the philosophical impact. With an infinite amount of cells filled with random
strategies we know that somewhere groupings of strategies would create a configuration
capable of Universal Computation.
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6
6.1

Social and Biological Relevance
Possible Implications

Jonathan D. Victor, a Neurologist at Cornell University, had this to say about the implica
tions of Neumann’s Cellular Automata in the context of brains:
The observation that the cerebral cortex is composed of a large number
of local neural assemblies that are iterated throughout its extent, by itself, is
not an existence proof that complex behavior may result from a network of
simple elements. Von Neumann’s construction is necessary to show that such
a structure is indeed capable of complex behavior, without the need to invoke
region-to-region variability, long-range interactions, stochastic components, or
mysticism. [20]
Similar to Victor’s interpretation of Neumann’s CA, a proof of Universal Computa
tion using the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game shows that people can convey information
across a large network through the simple act of defecting or cooperating. As another way
to put it, there might exist something in the whole of interactions of human kind that the
individual may not have awareness of. Quite unconsciously, we can transmit information
to people we don’t even know. Like a colony of ants, this simulation should blur the line
between what exists only as an individual and what exists only as part of a whole.
In Stephen Jay Gould’s book, “The Flamingo’s Smile”, he talks about the conti
nuity and ambiguity in defining a single organism, and a collection of organisms [12]. In
particular, he talks about Siphonophores, a creature made up of many individual organisms
that essentially cooperate together. The individual organisms can specialize to move the
colony, capture food, and even reproduce for the entire being!
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Axelrod’s original research shows how organisms can benefit from cooperation,
even in situations that create strong incentives to defect. In the context of Siphonophores,
one can conceive how cooperation leads to creating a colony of beings, which slowly forms
into its own organism. Research on both Siphonophores and cooperation bridges the gap
between the single cell and the multi-celled, the organism and the superorganism.
One could posit that this research - that focuses on the complex holistic interac
tions, showing nearly limitless potential interactions, Universal Computation as well as an
explanation of the persistence of variance and different strategies - helps us understand
complexity and differentiation in individual beings. It can add to our understanding of how
a single celled individual through simple interactions can evolve into the multicellular. Uni
versal Computation makes this simulation a compelling metaphor for a multiple leveled,
composite view of nature.
Since we have essentially found a machine that can compute any algorithm in our
simulation of the IPDG, we can essentially create a machine that plays the IPDG. In this
way it acts like a larger organism, composed of many smaller entities all with the same
goal. Then of course, we can create larger machines out of that, and go on recursively ad

infinitum.
Furthermore, the results found in this paper extend to all interactions reducible to
the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. From things as small and intricate as RNA to things
as subtle as washing dishes, this paper adds to the literature finding computation in many
aspects of nature.

6.2

Conclusion

This paper has shown many of the holistic effects emergent in a social CA simulation from
players with different deterministic strategies. First, for any number of iterations during a
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time step, the CA creates groupings of strategies that persist without invading each other
due to a point density effect. Furthermore, this effect can also create movement within the
lattice, as strategies invade and take over each other. This can create interesting patterns
algorithmically, like the Sierpinski Triangle.
By treating the movement of strategies as bits, this paper constructed a proof for
Universal Computation similar to that for Conway’s Life. By setting up particular for
mations of players, the simulation can create gliders and glider guns. These gliders work
similarly to signals along electrical circuits, and one can easily create any sort of digital
logic. One can also create a register or memory, central to a proof for Universal Computa
tion.
The interesting part of this thesis comes from the fact that this CA simulates a po
tential social interaction evident not only in human interactions, but also in nature. Where
other studies have focused on simpler interactions, with simpler players, this paper shows
that complex players with history don’t only propagate themselves, but they can also or
ganize themselves through the adoption of strategies with higher points and through the
imitation of more successful cells in a self-interested manner. If Axelrod showed us the
“Evolution of Cooperation”, surely this would be the “Evolution of Complexity and Orga
nization.”
This paper has also found an ideal number or iterations per time-step for players
that have a memory of three moves. Simulations with a number of iterations that focus
on the transient properties of a strategy will create the most complexity in a randomly
configured lattice. This implies that a person must remember all of an opponent’s history
for interesting results.
Finally, this paper has created evidence for the grand possibilities that human inter
actions (and other interactions) might have. It should bring into question whether or not
we convey information that we don’t intend to, and whether or not we can create a higher
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consciousness through interaction.
Of course, besides just the philosophical, creating Universal Computation with any
set of rules can be a fun and intellectually rigorous activity. I hope those who read this
paper had as much fun as I did.
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7

Further Ideas for Research

Some might read this paper skeptically identifying many of the weaknesses of this inter
pretation of Cellular Automata. For example, human interactions don’t always necessarily
follow the IPDG or any other game in game theory. Also, human interactions do not happen
in conveniently isolated neighborhoods with just 8 opponents in synchronized time steps.
In many ways real life contains a higher level of complexity and unpredictability that may
not always seem present in this cellular automaton.
One person’s doubts and apprehensions are someone else’s research. Further stud
ies that show similar results to the ones found here in different lattices, including ones
where each player has a unique variable neighborhood more akin to real life, would demon
strate the robustness of this theory. Especially if this research found both evidence in nature
and in further simulations that complexity emerges when players have a memory of all its
opponents moves, one can apply this theory as a supplement to the many others about evo
lution. Furthermore, a statistical mechanical approach as used by Bahr and Passerini can
approximate information about groups of people without “delving into the detailed social
processes of each individual” [7]. Thus, though a cellular automaton might not faithfully
adhere to the exact interactions of individuals, it may still accurately represent interactions
of the whole [6].
Also, many of the empirical findings in Section 4.1 have implications that one could
verify on real people under a controlled experiment. For example, are people more likely to
initially defect when they know they will interact with a person longer? Further computer
tournaments could also investigate the survivability of Unforgiving Tit for Tat. One could
even use the results of Section 4.1 to test if spatio-temporal systems accurately predict real
people’s behavior, assuming people transition between strategies in order to maximize their
utility. If such evidence exists, the IPDG CA will have potent predicting powers, and it will
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be the stepping stone for a lot more research with direct impact on several related subjects.
Hopefully this should also encourage research that looks for more holistic traits in
people’s interactions. The search for which strategies make the most points or for which
strategies are the most robust, loses sight of the possible complexity inherent in interactions.
Theories that just support Tit for Tat fail to account for why a person would pick a less than
optimal strategy or act less logically. All research on the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma could
benefit by emphasizing the interactions and locality. Great places to start would be social
networking websites. Something as small as whether or not a person sends or receives
messages could create a profound pattern.
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